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PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM  IN  A  MODEL  OF COMPETITIVE 

ARMS  ACCUMULATION 

This  paper  shows  that  the  subgame-perfect  Nash  strategic equilibrium, 
which is relevant when countries can monitor their rival's weapon stock, leads 
to lower levels of arms and higher welfare than the standard open-loop Nash 
strategic equilibrium for an arms race. This result is derived for a model of 
competitive arms accumulation, in which two countries face a classic "guns 
versus butter"  dilemma in the form of utilities which depend on consumption, 
leisure and the characteristic defence. Moreover, it is argued that the perfect 
equilibrium strategies lead to a more satisfactory strategic underpinning of the 
well-known Richardson equations. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Conflict over arms accumulation has in recent years become a more prevalent 
feature of relations between West and East. The political aspects of the arms race 
receive a great deal of  attention both in the press and in academic studies (e.g. 
Richardson  1960; Boulding  1961; McGuire  1965; and SIPRI 1982). Much of  the 
theoretical analysis of  arms conflict uses game theory  (e.g. Schelling  1980). The 
welfare of one country depends on the level of security which is perceived to be an 
increasing function of its own weapon stock and a decreasing function of the foreign 
weapon stock. This may be because any imbalance in weapon stocks increases the 
likelihood of loosing a possible war and increases the likelihood that a war might in 
fact be initiated. Alternatively, a country may simply feel that it gains international 
prestige from having a more superior army than its rivals. Both of these factors can 
in principle lead to a balance of terror. Such defence externalities can also be shown 
to lead  to  prisoner's  dilemma  situations.  In  the  absence  of  cooperation  each 
country builds up a larger weapon  stock than with cooperation, because in  the 
absence  of  commitments  no  country  trusts  the  other  countries  to  stick  to  a 
negotiated level of lower or zero weapon stocks. Other studies concentrate on the 
technological and strategic aspects of arms and the relationship to the probability 
that war breaks out (Saaty 1968; Intriligator 1975; Intriligator and Brito 1976, 1982). 
From the point of view of an economist the purely political analyses of conflict 
over arms do not pay adequate attention to the "guns  versus butter"  dilemma. A 
higher level of investment in weapons eventually increases the feeling of security 
and thus welfare, but it also means that there are less resources available for private 
sector consumption and therefore welfare diminishes. A variety of studies employ 
optimal control and differential game theory to analyse the intertemporal trade-offs 
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inherent in such "guns  versus butter"  dilemmas (e.g. Brito 1972; Deger and Sen 
1984).  The  problem  with  the  differential  game  studies  is  that  they  consider 
open-loop Nash equilibrium  solutions whereas feedback Nash equilibrium  solu- 
tions are more appropriate for two reasons. Firstly, the feedback model employs 
more realistic information patterns, since each country can nowadays be assumed 
to be able to monitor the current levels of each other's weapon stocks rather than 
only the initial levels. Secondly, the linear-quadratic feedback model provides a 
strategic underpinning of the Richardson equations, which show up as first-order 
conditions for optimal investment behaviour in arms. The informational nonunique- 
ness  resulting from closed-loop  information  patterns  with  memory  (Ba~ar  and 
Olsder 1982) is resolved when the principle of subgame-perfectness (Selten 1975) is 
imposed, which has the added advantage that the resulting feedback equilibrium 
strategies are credible. The feedback approach to the problem of competitive arms 
accumulation was proposed before (Simaan and Cruz 1975), but that paper does not 
give a full characterisation of the strategic equilibrium, so that it was not possible 
to compare the levels of weapon stocks in the feedback approach with the levels in 
the open-loop approach and to perform comparative  statics with  respect to the 
underlying parameters of the behavioural model. 
The main objectives of this paper are to provide a more satisfactory strategic 
foundation of the Richardson model and to show that the subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium leads to less weapon accumulation in both countries than the open-loop 
Nash equilibrium. This means that the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is more 
efficient, since both countries obtain higher welfare  as they  can consume more 
goods and leisure without feeling less secure. The policy  conclusion is that both 
countries  should  be  encouraged  to  monitor  each  other's  weapon  stocks.  The 
analysis is set up as follows. There are two countries involved in the arms race. The 
West  is  a  decentralised  market  economy  whose  government  maximises  the 
discounted utility of a representative household and levies lump-sum taxes in order 
to finance investment in arms and provide a public good, defence. The East is a 
centrally planned economy. Utility in both countries is a function of consumption, 
leisure and defence. Defence is a characteristic which depends on the difference 
between home and foreign  weapon  stocks. When  consumption  and  leisure  are 
normal goods, there is a "guns versus butter"  dilemma as more taxes lead to more 
weapons at the expense of less consumption and leisure. Section 2 formulates this 
two-country model. The model is kept as simple as possible. Extensions to more 
general utility functions, distortionary taxation in the West or other formulations, 
which pay more attention to the different economic systems of the two countries, 
do not change the results of  this paper on the impact of  information. Section 3 
derives the main cooperative outcome of the resulting differential game and shows 
that cooperation leads to a moratorium on investment in weapons. Section 4 gives 
the noncooperative Nash equilibrium for the case where countries cannot observe 
their rival's  current weapon stock. Section 5 gives the perfect equilibrium, which 
corresponds to the case where countries can monitor their rival's  current weapon 
stock.  It  is  shown that  this  approach  is  more  efficient, leads  to less  weapon 
accumulation  and  provides  a  more  satisfactory  strategic  underpinning  of  the 
Richardson equations. The resulting parameters of the Richardson equations are 133  COMPETITIVE ARMS ACCUMULATION 
compared with what would result with the open-loop approach and a sensitivity 
analysis for these parameters  with  respect  to the underlying  parameters of  the 
model is performed. Section 6 attends to the case in which one of the countries tries 
to become a Stackelberg leader by announcing its policy beforehand. It is shown 
that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium leads to less weapon accumulation than 
the corresponding  Nash equilibrium  and  makes  the  leader  worse  off  than  the 
follower. The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, as well as the feedback consistent 
conjectures equilibrium, coincides with the feedback Nash equilibrium. Section 7 
concludes the paper and contains some suggestions for further research. 
The West is a decentralised market economy with a representative household, a 
representative firm and a government. There are no domestic or foreign financial 
assets and the economy does not engage in international trade. There is no private 
capital  accumulation,  although  the government  does  invest  in  weapon  stocks. 
There is only one domestically produced commodity, which can be used for both 
consumption  and  investment  purposes.  The  government  demands  goods  for 
investment, the household supplies labour and demands goods for consumption, 
and the firm demands labour and supplies goods. The real wage adjusts in order to 
ensure labour  market  equilibrium.  The government  finances  the investment in 
arms, i.e., the provision of the public good defence, by means of nondistortionary 
taxation and maximises the utility of the representative household. The household 
maximises utility u(c,I, d),where c,  1 and d denote consumption, labour supply and 
defence, subject to its budget constraint 0 5 c 5 wl  + .ir - r,where w, .ir  and T 
denote the real wage, profits and lump-sum taxes, respectively. Utility is assumed 
to be separable in defence. Defence is a characteristic (cf. Lancaster 1966),which 
is an increasing function of the own weapon stock, a,  and a decreasing function of 
the foreign weapon stock, a*, that is d = D(a,  a*). Furthermore, it is assumed that 
an equal increase in  both  home and foreign  weapon  stocks leaves the level  of 
defence or security unaffected, that is D,(a, a*) = -D,=(a, a*) > 0.  For an interior 
solution, the marginal rate of substitution between leisure, 1 - I, and consumption 
equals the real opportunity cost of leisure, that is -ul/u, = w. The firm maximises 
profits .ir  = f(1) - wl, where  f  is a concave production function, which yields w = 
fl(l).Goods market equilibrium implies f(1) = c + g,  where g denotes the level of 
government investment, and the government's budget constraint is g = T. It follows 
that the indirect utility function for the government can, without loss of generality, 
be written as 
where U' = u,C'  + ulL1,  C' = (u,f"  + crll  + uClf')/A, L'  = -(ul,  + u,,f')/A and 
A - -[u,f" + !ill  + 2uClf1 + u,,(  f~)~]  > 0. It will be assumed that consumption 
and leisure are normal goods, so that an increase in taxes reduces consumption, 
leisure and thus utility  (C' < 0, L'  > 0, U' < 0). A sufficient condition for this 
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assumption that utility is separable in defence is primarily made for methodological 
reasons.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  problem  of  arms  accumulation  should  be 
modelled as an insurance where the level of defence decreases the probability of 
being attacked and therefore increases the probability that nobody survives and 
that the utility  of  all the current and all future generations from then on is zero 
(Shepherd 1988). This argument suggests that, if an attack only affects the utility of 
the current generation, an appropriate  utility  function might  be P[a - a*]O(g), 
where P[.] denotes the instantaneous probability of not being attacked, P' > 0, and 
O(g)  denotes the indirect utility function. Taking the logarithm yields (1) with U(g) 
= log (O(g)) and D(a, a*) = log (P(a - a*)). A proper analysis of the probabilities 
of survival, when an attack destroys the current and all future generations, requires 
an  intertemporal  stochastic  framework,  but  this  leads  to  a  differential  game 
formulation which is extremely difficult to solve. In any case, such an intergener- 
ational analysis is more appropriate for a nuclear arms than for a conventional arms 
buildup.  However,  if  the  analysis  allows  for  nuclear  attacks  where  all  future 
generations are wiped out, then the only credible, noncooperative equilibrium is for 
neither country to accumulate missiles. When the buildup of nuclear weapons leads 
to a finite probability  of an attack which is too horrendous to consider and when 
there exists a zero probability of attack, there is no incentive for arms buildup. In 
other words, deterrence requires the probability  of  commitment  to investments 
which  may  imply  launching missiles  and blowing  up  the world  and which  are 
therefore not rational to carry out if  called upon to do so. This seems to exclude 
perfect equilibrium as an appropriate solution concept for deterrence games. 
The separable specifications of utility investigated so far (see van der Ploeg and 
de Zeeuw 1989) show the same role of information, so that the main result of this 
paper seems to be robust with respect to alterations in the utility function. In order 
to be able to obtain analytical solutions a second-order Taylor series approximation 
of indirect utility is adopted. If preferences are quadratic and technology is linear, 
the approximation is exact. This yields a strategic underpinning of the Richardson 
equations and enables a  comparison  of  different  game  equilibria  as well  as a 
sensitivity analysis with respect to the underlying parameters of the model. The 
quadratic approximation is given by 
(2)  U(g) + D(a, a*) = Bo + O1g- (1/2)02g2 + 03(a- a*) - (1/2)04(a- a*)' 
where g = 01/02  and m = 03/04> 0 can be interpreted as the target level of public 
spending and the desired lead in weapon stocks, respectively. The assumption of 
normal goods, U' = O1 - 02g < 0, implies that g > g for all g 2 0, so that O1  5 0 
must hold. The intertemporal utility of the West for the problem starting at time t 
is given by the infinite-horizon value function 
V(t, a,  a*) = r'  [U(g) + D(a, a*)] exp [-r (s - t)]ds 135  COMPETITIVE ARMS ACCUMULATION 
where r. is the rate of time preference. The West maximises V(0, ao,  a;),  where a. 
and a:  are the initial weapon stocks, subject to the arms accumulation for home 
weapons 
where 6 is the depreciation rate, and similarly for foreign weapons. The dilemma of 
"guns  versus butter"  is that high taxes are required to finance a large buildup of 
weapons, but this necessarily implies less private consumption and leisure. 
The East is a command or centrally planned economy. The variables in the East 
are denoted by an asterisk. Because the purpose of the paper is only to show the 
impact of monitoring, it is assumed that the East has the same technologies and 
preferences as the West. The government plans c*, I*  and g* to maximise utility, 
u(c*, l*, d*),subject to the material balance condition, f(l*) = c* + g*. This yields 
the same indirect utility function as in the West, UCg*)  + D(a*, a). 
The  decentralised  market  economy  of  the  West  and  the  centrally  planned 
economy of the East are identical, because identical technologies and preferences 
have been assumed and because no distortions or market imperfections have been 
considered and therefore the fundamental theorem of welfare economics holds. If 
the  West  had  to levy  distortionary  taxes  on labour  income,  there  would  be 
asymmetries  and the  East and  West  would  not  have  the same indirect  utility 
function. With identical  technologies  and preferences,  the tax distortions in  the 
West imply lower levels of employment, output and consumption for a given level 
of government investment in arms. However, the conclusions with respect to the 
comparison of different game equilibria will be the same (see van der Ploeg and de 
Zeeuw 1989). Another form of asymmetry between the two economies occurs when 
one allows for rigid  wages and prices in the short run, because then the West is 
likely to be in a regime of Keynesian unemployment and the East in a regime of 
repressed inflation (see Malinvaud  1977). 
3.  COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR 
Pareto-efficient outcomes for the differential game formulated in Section 2 are 
found from the maximisation with respect to g and g* of 
(5)  [{a[U(g)+ D(a, a*)] + (1 - a)[U(g*) + D(a*, a)]} exp (-rt)  dt 
subject to (4) and a* = g* - 6a*, a*(O) = a;,  where 0 5 LY 5 1. It follows that the 
marginal  disutilities  of  government  investment  in  arms  in  terms  of  foregone 
consumption and leisure (-aU1(y) and -(1  - a)U1(g*)  for the West and the East, 
respectively)  should  equal  the  marginal  values  of  weapon  stocks,  which  are 
denoted by  A  and A*,  respectively, if  this is feasible. Otherwise, if  the marginal 
disutility  of  government  spending exceeds the marginal  value  of  weapons,  the 
complementary  slackness conditions imply that no investment in weapons takes 136  F. VAN DER PLOEG AND A. J. DE ZEEUW 
place (g = 0 if  -aU1(g) > A). The marginal values of  the weapon  stocks must 
satisfy 
(6)  A = (V + 6)A - aD,(a, a*) - (1 - cu)D,(a*, a), 
lim  exp (-rt)A(t)a(t)= 0 
1'" 
and 
(7)  A*  = (V + 6)A* - aD,-(a, a*) - (1 - cu)D,*(a*,  a), 
lim  exp (-rt)A*(t)a*(t)= 0. 
1-+m 
One interpretation of (6) through (7)is that the "rental"  charge plus the depreci- 
ation charge minus the capital gains term defines the user cost of  weapons and 
should match the marginal utility  of weapons to the world. If equal weights are 
attached to the West and the East (a  = 112),it follows that in the steady state A = 
A*  = 0,  as in the steady state (or when the initial weapon stocks of the two countries 
are the same) the game is zero-sum at the margin with respect to a  and a*  (i.e., 
D,(a,  a*) + D,(a*,  a) =  -2O4(a - a*) = 0  and similarly the sum of  marginal 
utilities of defence with respect to the foreign weapon stock is zero). For O1 < 0 the 
steady-state cooperative outcome is a corner solution, but for O1 = 0 the corner 
solution coincides with the unconstrained solution. To avoid corner solutions, both 
in this section and in later sections, and to ensure that the assumption of normal 
goods is satisfied for all g 2 0, the value of  8, can be taken to be zero. It follows 
that in the steady state g = g*  = a = a* = 0, so that the cooperative outcome is to 
have a moratorium on investment in weapons and to run down weapon stocks until 
these have fallen to zero. 
This analysis leans heavily  on the property  that the game is  zero-sum at the 
margin,  which is satisfied because the defence characteristic depends upon the 
difference in arms levels. For example, when it depends also upon the sum of arms 
levels and is given by 
(8)  D(a,  a*) = 03(a-a*)- (112)04(a-a*)2+  05(a+a*)  -(l12)06(a+a*)2 
with OS, 96  2 0,  the game is no longer zero-sum at the margin in the long run. This 
set-up can easily be shown to result in 
so that when both countries want a positive stock of weapons between the two of 
them (9s > 0)  their steady-state levels of weapons will be positive. This defence 
characteristic may be realistic when the two countries want a positive stock of 
weapons  to act as a  deterrence for third  countries.  The transient  cooperative 
solution is best obtained by solving for the global averages and global differences 
separately. This is possible, because (a - a*) and (A - A*) on the one hand and 137  COMPETITIVE ARMS ACCUMULATION 
112(a + a*) and 1/2(A+ A*) on the other hand form two decoupled subsystems of 
differential equations. Application of this procedure and some algebraic manipula- 
tions yield the cooperative trajectory 
a(t)= a(co)[l- exp (out)] + 1/2(ao+ a$)  exp (out) + 1/2(ao- a$)  exp (wdt) 
and similarly for a*(t),where o, = 1/2[r- d(r  + 2612 + 16  06/02]  < 0 denotes the 
stable  eigenvalue  associated  with  the  system  of  global  averages  and  od = 
112[r - d(r  + 2612 + 1604/02]< 0 denotes the stable eigenvalue associated with 
the system of global differences. Again it can be seen that, if the initial arms levels 
are the same (ao = a;) and countries only care about differences in arms levels 
(05 = O6  = O), the cooperative outcome is to have a moratorium on investment in 
arms and to run down stocks via wear and tear until these have fallen to zero (a(t) 
= a*(t) = a.  exp (-6t)). In general, the adjustment speeds up when the relative 
priorities of  "guns"  rather than "butter"  (04/02and 06/02)increase. The level of 
investment in arms in the cooperative outcome can be written as g = gC- 1/2(od 
+ 6)(a* - a)  + 1/2(o, + 6)(a+ a*),where gC= Ga(a),so that investment in home 
arms is a negative function of the global stock of arms and of the excess of the stock 
of home arms over foreign arms. 
In the absence of a mechanism which enforces the cooperative outcome, each 
country has an incentive to deviate by increasing its security at the expense of its 
rival, if the desired lead in weapons is positive (03> 0).Therefore the cooperative 
outcome will only be considered as a benchmark for the relative efficiency of the 
different noncooperative outcomes, which will be considered in the next sections. 
4.  OPEN-LOOP NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
Consider the situation where the West and the East do not cooperate and where 
neither country dominates the arms race, so that a Nash equilibrium is appropriate. 
The Nash equilibrium concept can lead to different types of solutions when applied 
to differential games (e.g. Starr and Ho 1969a, b). In order to analyse the problem 
of  competitive  arms  accumulation  Brito  (1972) employed  the  open-loop  Nash 
equilibrium concept. This concept presumes that the investments in arms at each 
point in time are only conditioned on the initial weapon stocks, ao and a;, and that 
each country precommits itself to a path of investment in arms. It follows that the 
expected investments of the rival do not depend on past or current weapon stocks, 
or  on  past  or  current  investments  of  the  country  under  consideration.  The 
expectations of each other's path of investment are correct in equilibrium. In order 
to be able to compare the open-loop Nash equilibrium with other equilibria in the 
next sections it will be fully characterised in this section. The first-order conditions, 
which result from Pontryagin's maximum principle, give rise to 
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(13)  A = (r + 6)A - O3 + 04(a- a*),  lim  exp (-rt)A(t)a(t) = 0 
1- c.= 
(14)  A*= (r + 6)A* - 83 + 04(a*  -a),  lim  exp (-rt)A*(t)a*(t) = 0 
1'" 
where A and A*  denote the marginal values of their own weapon stocks for the West 
and the East, respectively. The marginal disutility of public spending, -U1(g)= 
02g - 0  1, has to match the marginal value of weapons, A,  which gives investment 
in arms as an increasing function of its marginal value, g = (A  + 01)102.The steady 
state of (I  I) through (14) yields 
The steady-state levels of weapon stocks are positive, which can be interpreted as 
the familiar deterrence or "balance of terror"  argument. They increase when the 
discount  rate  or the  depreciation rate decreases, when the relative  priority  of 
"butter"  rather  than  "guns"  (02/04)decreases,  and  when  the  desired  lead  in 
weapon  stocks over the rival  country  (03/04) increases.  The steady  state  is  a 
saddlepoint, since there are two stable eigenvalues 
( - 6  and  112[r - d(r  + 26)2+ 804/02]) 
associated  with  the  backward-looking variables,  a  and  a*,  and  two  unstable 
eigenvalues 
(r+6  and  1/2[r+~(r+2~)~+8O~/O~]) 
associated with the forward-looking variables, A  and A*.  Since (!I)  through (14) is 
effectively a perfect-foresight  system, Buiter's  (1984) method of  spectral decom- 
position or the method of undetermined coefficients can be used to solve it. It can 
be shown that the stable manifold  is given by  A  = I,b002(a* - a) + 03/(r + S), 
where 
so that g =  + $O  (a* - a). It follows that investment in weapons is higher than 
its steady-state level when foreign weapon stocks exceed home weapon stocks and 
that the marginal increase in investment,  I,b0,  increases when the discount rate or 
the depreciation rate decreases and when the relative priority of  "butter"  rather 
than "guns"  (02/04)decreases. Upon substitution one obtains 
which is a stable system as the eigenvalues associated with (16) through (17) (-6 
and -214'  - 6)  are both negative. Note that an increase in the depreciation rate 
increases the magnitude of both eigenvalues and therefore speeds up the route to 139  COMPETITIVE ARMS ACCUMULATION 
the steady state. Equations (16)through (17)can be looked upon as Richardson's 
(1960) equations, where  $O  is  the "defence"  coefficient,  $O  +  8  the  "fatigue" 
coefficient  and go the "grievance"  or "hatred"  coefficient. However, this inter- 
pretation  seems  inappropriate  in  view  of  the  open-loop nature of  the  solution 
concept. In the open-loop Nash equilibrium the countries cannot condition their 
investments on current weapon stocks, so that g  = go + $'(a*  - a)  should be 
interpreted as a relation between the optimal sequence of levels of investment and 
the resulting  sequence of  weapon  stocks, and  not  as a  feedback  strategy  for 
investment in arms. Olsder (1977) calls this the "open-loop,  open-eye"  represen- 
tation of the open-loop solution, but when monitoring of weapon stocks is feasible 
the "closed-loop, open-eye" representation of the closed-loop solution seems more 
appropriate (see Section 5). 
Equations  (16) through  (17) can  be  integrated  to  give  the  open-loop  Nash 
equilibrium strategy 
(18)  g(t)= go  + $'(a$ - ao)exp [-(2$O  + 8)t] 
with trajectory 
(19)  a(t)= a(m)[l- exp (-st)] + 112(ao+ a$)  exp (-St) 
+ 112(ao- a$)  exp [-(2$O  + S)t] 
and similarly for g*  and a*, where a(m) = g0/8. When both countries start with 
identical  weapon  stocks  (ao =  a;)), investment  in  weapons  is  always  at  its 
steady-state level (g(t)= go, for all  t 2 0) and any excess of  the initial level of 
weapon  stocks over the steady-state level is  gradually  eliminated  at the rate of 
depreciation.  When  the rival  country's  initial  weapon  stock  exceeds the home 
initial  weapon  stock,  the home  country's  investment  in  weapons  exceeds  the 
steady-state level. The speed at which the difference in initial weapon stocks is 
eliminated, 2$O  + 6 = -1/2[v- d(v  + 2 ~ ) ~  increases when the discount  + 804/02], 
rate decreases and when the depreciation rate or the relative priority  of  "guns" 
rather than "butter"  increases. This speed of adjustment can easily be shown to be 
less than the speed of adjustment of the cooperative outcome (-wd in Section 3), 
so that lack of cooperation slows down adjustment. 
Since the marginal values of Eastern weapon stocks to the West and vice versa 
do not  affect  the open-loop Nash equilibrium,  it  does not  matter whether  the 
countries observe their own weapon stock or not. This means that the open-loop 
Nash equilibrium also describes the situation where each country monitors its own 
weapon  stock, but not the weapon stock of  the rival country. The next  section 
considers the situation where each country can also monitor the foreign weapon 
stock. 
5.  PERFECT NASH  EQUILIBRIUM 
The closed-loop Nash equilibrium allows each country to condition its invest- 
ment  in  weapons  on  the  current  and  past  stocks  of  weapons.  This  type  of 140  F. VAN DER PLOEG AND A. J. DE ZEEUW 
information structure admits, among others, memory and threat strategies, so that 
the solution set is nonunique (Ba~ar  and Olsder 1982). However, if the principle of 
subgame perfectness (Selten  1975) is imposed, then uniqueness typically results. 
The outcome will be called the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium 
concept in closed-loop strategies, which will depend only upon the current weapon 
stocks of the two countries, requires that for each subgame the relevant part of the 
set of strategies is in Nash equilibrium. A subgame in this context is a game over 
the remainder  of  the time horizon, that is  over [< a)  rather than  [0,  m).  The 
restriction of  the solution to a subgame must be a Nash equilibrium for all  tE 
[0, m)  and for all possible levels of weapon stocks at  Each country expects the 
other country to react rationally  at time tto  the information about the current 
weapon stocks at time rand in equilibrium these expectations are correct. Subgame 
perfectness rules out threat equilibria, which  rely  on information patterns with 
memory, and equilibria which imply future investments  that are not rational to 
carry out if  called  upon to do so in the future. This setup is  analogous to the 
requirement  that  the solution to the differential game has  to satisfy Bellman's 
principle of optimality. In that context Starr and Ho (1969b) and Simaan and Cruz 
(1975) refer to the outcome as the  feedback Nash equilibrium. The subgame-perfect 
or feedback Nash equilibrium can be found by dynamic programming. 
The maximisation in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the West yields 
g = (V,  + 01)/02= G(t, a,  a*), where V(t, a,  a") is the value function for the West, 
and similarly for the East. Upon substitution, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa- 
tions become the set of coupled partial differential equations 
(21)  rV* - VT  = U(G(t, a*, a)) + D(a*, a) + V,*(g- Sa) + V,-(g" - Sa*) 
where U and D are given by the quadratic approximation (2). In general it is very 
difficult  to find value functions  V and V"  that solve (20)  through  (21).  For the 
quadratic approximation, however, quadratic value functions lead to an analytical 
solution. Hence, presume that V is given by 
(22)  V(t, a,  a*) = po + pla  + p2a* - (l/2)aPa1 
where a is the row-vector (a, a*) and P = [Pi] is a positive semi-definite symmetric 
matrix, and similarly for V*(t, a", a) with row vector a" = (a", a)  and parameters 
pz,  PT, p;  and P*. Substitution of (22) in (20) through (21) and equating coefficients 
on a,  a", a2,  a*2 and aa* yields p;  = p,  ,p;  = p2,  P* = P and the set of coupled 
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There is only one steady state of (23) through (27) which ensures that the matrix P 
is positive semi-definite. This steady state is given by 
(28)  Pll  = P22= -P12= -(1/6)02[r + 28 - Z/(Y+ 28)2+ 1204/02] >  0 
It follows that the investment strategies in the perfect Nash equilibrium are given 
by g = gP + GP(a* - a)  and g* = gp + $P(a - a*) where 
and where the steady-state level of investment gP > 0 is given by 
As in  the open-loop  Nash equilibrium, the steady-state  levels of  investment in 
weapon  stocks,  gP (the  grievance  coefficient),  and  the  marginal  increase  in 
investment, GP (the defence coefficient), increase when the discount rate or the 
depreciation rate decreases and when the relative priority of "butter"  rather than 
"guns"  (02/04)  decreases, and the steady-state levels of weapon stocks increase 
when the desired lead in weapon stocks over the rival country (03/04)  increases. 
Upon substitution of the investment strategy of the West in (4) one obtains 
and similarly for the East. In contrast with  the results  of  the open-loop  Nash 
analysis,  it  seems appropriate to view  these  equations  as Richardson's  (1960) 
equations, as investments in arms in the perfect Nash equilibrium are conditioned 
on the observable weapon stocks. Olsder (1977) calls the investment strategies the 
"closed-loop, open-eye" representation of the closed-loop solution in contrast with 
the "closed-loop,  closed-eye"  representation,  which  refers to the expected  se-
quence of levels of investment in arms for the closed-loop solution. It follows that 
it is meaningful to consider the perfect Nash equilibrium for the differential game 
formulated in Section 2 as the strategic underpinning of the Richardson equations 
with $P  as the defence coefficient, $P  + 8 as the fatigue coefficient and gp  as the 
grievance or hatred coefficient. Obviously, it is possible to integrate (32) over time 
to give the analogues of  (18) (the "closed-loop,  closed-eye"  representation)  and 
(19) with go and  replaced by gP and GP. 
The most interesting aspect of  the comparison  between the open-loop Nash 
equilibrium and the perfect Nash equilibrium is that monitoring of foreign weapon 
stocks decreases the grievance coefficient (go >gP),SO that monitoring leads to less 
accumulation of weapon stocks than in the absence of  monitoring.  The intuition 
behind  this  result  is  that,  when  one  country  considers  the  purchase  of  one 
additional unit of weapons, it considers the direct marginal contribution to security 
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will observe the additional purchase and will feel less secure, so that it will also 
purchase  more  weapons.  Therefore  the  marginal  contribution  to  security  and 
welfare is reduced to D, + GP Vcr*< Dn,SO that there is less incentive to invest in 
weapons than when countries cannot observe their rival's weapon stock. Since the 
perfect Nash equilibrium leads to more "butter"  and less "guns,"  but with the 
same feeling of security, it is more efficient than the open-loop Nash equilibrium. 
The obvious policy implication is that countries should be encouraged to monitor 
each other's weapon stocks as this will lead to some unilateral disarmament and 
higher welfare.  Another feature of monitoring is that the defence coefficient can 
easily be shown to be larger than without monitoring ($P > $O).  It follows that the 
adjustment to the (lower) steady-state levels of arms is faster than in the absence of 
monitoring. However, this speed of adjustment can be shown to be still less than 
the speed of adjustment of the cooperative outcome (2GP + 8 < -cod). 
Note that, when defence is a linear function of the difference in weapon stocks 
(04 = O),  the defence coefficients  are zero  ($P  =  = 0)  and the grievance 
coefficient is independent of whether countries can monitor their rival's  weapon 
stock or not (gP =  In fact for this special case the open-loop and subgame- 
perfect Nash equilibria coincide and therefore monitoring does not influence the 
levels  of  weapon  stocks. This result  generalises  to the  case where defence  is 
separable in home and foreign weapon stocks (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw 1989). 
Finally, note that, when neither country attempts to establish a lead in weapon 
stocks (03 = O),  the noncooperative equilibria (with or without monitoring  the 
rival's weapon stock) coincide with the cooperative outcome with a moratorium on 
investment in weapons. 
This  section considers the  situation  where  one of  the  countries  attempts to 
improve  its  welfare  by  announcing  its  investments  in  arms  or its  investment 
strategy beforehand, so that a Stackelberg equilibrium is appropriate. As for the 
Nash equilibrium concept it is possible to distinguish the open-loop Stackelberg 
equilibrium without monitoring and the subgame-perfect or feedback Stackelberg 
equilibrium with monitoring. 
Consider first the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium (see e.g. Ba~ar  and Olsder 
1982) with  the West as the leader and the  East as the follower.  The leader  is 
assumed to be able to precommit itself to an announced sequence of  investment 
levels in arms. The rational reaction of the follower is g* = (A*  + 01)102  where A* 
is given by (14).  This implies  that the follower's  level of  investment in  arms is 
characterised by the differential equation 
(33)  g* = (u + S)g* + [04(a*- a) - O3 - (u + 8)01]102, g(0) is free. 
The leader then  maximises  its  intertemporal utility  V(0,  ao, a;), given  by  (3), 
subject to the arms accumulation for home and foreign weapons, (4), and subject to 
the rational reaction of the follower, (33). The first-order conditions give rise to (4) 
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(36) by p(t) = 0 for all t r 0. This solution coincides with  the open-loop Nash 
equilibrium and therefore leads to a higher level of investment in arms and a loss of 
welfare for both countries. The "loss-of-leadership"  solution is time-consistent as 
the leader has effectively given up its role as leader, but it is obviously not subgame 
perfect. Another solution to the problem of time-inconsistency  is to consider the 
subgame-perfect or feedback  Stackelberg equilibrium  (Ba~ar  and Olsder  1982), 
which is time-consistent by definition, but which requires closed-loop information 
patterns.  Because the indirect utility functions, (I), do not depend upon foreign 
levels  of  investment  in  weapons,  the  subgame-perfect  Stackelberg equilibrium 
coincides with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. It is to be expected that the 
enforcement  of  credibility  of  the leader's  announcement  again  leads to higher 
stocks  of  arms  as with  the  loss-of-leadership  solution.  However,  there  is  an 
opposing force arising from the benefits of monitoring which leads to lower weapon 
stocks. It can be shown, after considerable algebraic manipulation, that when the 
relative priority of "butter"  rather than "guns"  (02/e4)is very high the monitoring 
force dominates and that therefore the imposition of  subgame perfectness for the 
Stackelberg equilibrium also leads to less weapon stocks (gp< gS < g*S). 
In the Stackelberg equilibrium  it is assumed that one of  the countries reacts 
rationally to the investments in arms or the investment strategy of the rival country 
and that this  rival  country chooses an optimal  investment policy,  which  takes 
account of that rational reaction. The consistent conjectural variations equilibrium 
(Bresnahan  1981) attempts to capture this idea for the two countries at once by 
introducing conjectured reaction coefficients for both countries, which have to be 
consistent with the actual reaction coefficients. Although this equilibrium concept 
is logically not very well founded (de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg 1987), it would again 
lead, for the problem of  competitive  arms accumulation, to the same subgame- 
perfect equilibrium. 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The conflict over arms accumulation between two countries, whose governments 
consider a "guns  versus butter"  dilemma, can be modelled as a differential game. 
Cooperation  would  lead  to  a  moratorium  on  investment  in  weapons,  which 
corresponds to a multilateral arms treaty. The open-loop Nash equilibrium pre- 
sumes that countries  cannot condition their investments in  arms on the rival's 
current weapon stock, whereas the perfect Nash equilibrium presumes that they 
can. The perfect Nash equilibrium leads to lower levels of arms accumulation and 
more "butter,"  so that it is more efficient. It follows that an unilateral arms treaty 
should  enable  countries  to observe their  rival's  weapon  stock.  Moreover, the 
perfect  Nash  equilibrium  gives  a  more  satisfactory  strategic foundation of  the 
Richardson equations which shows that investment in arms increases proportion- 
ately with the level of weapon stocks of the rival nation ("defence")  and the desired 
weapon lead ("grievance"  or "hatred")  and decreases proportionately with the 
economic burden of its own weapon stock ("fatigue").  The desired lead in weapon 
stocks  over the  rival  country  and  the  relative  priority  of  "guns"  rather  than 
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state levels of weapon stocks. The discount  rate, the depreciation rate and the 
relative priority of  "butter"  rather than "guns"  negatively influence the defence 
coefficients and therefore the speed of adjustment to the steady state. The fatigue 
coefficients consist of the sum of the defence coefficients and the depreciation rate. 
There are several interesting directions for further research. The first direction is 
to improve the microeconomic foundations of the economic models of the West and 
the East and to allow for asymmetries in these models. For example, in the present 
paper the government of the West uses lump-sum taxation to finance the invest- 
ment in weapons. Because such taxes are nondistortionary, the two economies are 
identical when technologies  and preferences are the same. However, when  the 
government of the West has to resort to distortionary taxes on labour income, then 
output, employment and consumption are lower in the West than in the East for a 
given level of  investment in weapons, and also the steady-state level of weapon 
stocks is lower. Distortionary taxes considerably complicate the indirect utility and 
value functions, so that one has to resort to numerical methods for the calculation 
of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw 1989). Obviously, 
a more interesting model would not only allow for distortionary taxes but also for 
money-  and  debt-finance  of  government  investment  in  arms  and  for  different 
technologies and preferences. To take another example, when wages and prices do 
not clear the labour and goods markets instantaneously, it may be reasonable to 
assume that the West is in a regime of Keynesian unemployment and the East in a 
regime  of  repressed  inflation  (Malinvaud  1977). Since the  West  has  an excess 
supply of labour and goods, investment in weapons not only increases the feeling 
of security but has also Keynesian employment generating effects. However, the 
East has an excess demand for labour and goods, so that investment in weapons 
increases the feeling  of  security at the expense of  more rationing.  The second 
direction for further research is to allow also for economic linkages between the 
two countries, due to bilateral trade flows and international capital movements. If 
there  is  nominal  (real) wage  rigidity  in  both countries and if  there  are floating 
exchange  rates,  government  investment  in  weapons  is  a  locomotive  (beggar- 
thy-neighbour)  policy.  It  follows  that,  in  the  absence  of  international  policy 
coordination, government investment in weapons is too low (high) as the beneficial 
(adverse) effects on the rival country are ignored.  Finally, the third direction of 
further  research  is  to  investigate  when  cooperation  in  arms  accumulation  is 
counter-productive. For example, when government policy is time-inconsistent due 
to, say, nominal wage  rigidity, cooperation can exacerbate the credibility  con- 
straints with  respect to the private  sector and therefore be counter-productive 
(Rogoff  1985). 
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